

Approved for Release 1999/09/10 : CIA-RDP80-00058R000200110

A Major Administrative Shake-Out Is Expected as McCone, a Strong Organizer, Takes Over

Special to The New York Times.

President Kennedy's appointment of John A. McCone to succeed Allen W. Dulles as director of the Central Intelligence Agency has met with substantial approval in Washington, but left some quarters apprehensive. In consequence, his attributes as a hard-boiled business executive and organizer are being weighed against his alleged deficiencies in the intricate field of foreign affairs.

The director of the C. I. A. does, indeed, exert a vital influence on both the design and the implementation of foreign policy. His is the chief responsibility for marshalling and interpreting the information about foreign governments, their capabilities and intentions, upon which this Government's international stratagema and reactions are based. If he produces inaccurate or incomplete intelligence, the nation's policies, and even its destiny, can be endangered.

The C. I. A. came into being under the National Security Act of 1947. This legislation made three fundamental changes in the nation's security structure. It partially unified the armed forces. It created the National Security Council to be a central policy planning agency for the President—a sort of full-time war cabinet. And it set up the C. I. A. to coordinate and enlarge the nation's intelligence resources to a degree never before achieved.

The C. I. A. has a three-fold function.

First, it is supposed to coordinate and receive assistance from all other intelligence-gathering agencies.

Second, it is empowered to conduct its own intelligence operations.

Third, it acts through its director as the chief adviser and consultant on intelligence matters to the President and the N. S. C.

Under the second category, the C. I. A. also has authority to carry out such operations "of common concern" to the national security as it may be directed by the N. S. C. This euphemism covers an unknown range of clandestine activities—"black operations," in the professional lingo—which may include any

thing from fomenting street riots in a distant capital to landing armed revolutionaries in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba.

Overt and Covert

• The C. I. A. gets the material for its secret intelligence estimates from whatever sources and by whatever means are available. Overtly, it has a staff of scholars and specialists who comb through foreign newspapers, Government and industrial reports and anything else it can get its hands on. Covertly, it has its corps of undercover agents—spies and informers—to get the material that cannot be had by more orthodox means.

Evaluating, analyzing and putting together these infinitely varied bits and pieces into a meaningful picture for the President and Security Council is the most important single aspect of the C. I. A.'s work. This is the ultimate responsibility of the director.

In its almost fifteen years of existence, the C. I. A. has become either a bureaucratic marvel or a bureaucratic monstrosity, depending on the point of view. Its budget is secret, but is said to be about \$1,000,000,000. It is moving into a new building in nearby Virginia that is exceeded in size only by the Pentagon. It has at least 100,000 employees.

Its cloak of secrecy has become threadbare in spots, but total mystery still conceals most of its operations from all but the official elite.

The Third Man

C. I. A. has had only three directors, and Mr. Dulles has been in the job since 1963. His career, stretching back to the Nineteen Twenties, as well as his manner and appearance, makes him a prototype of the professional intelligence agent. He and J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were the first hold-over officials of the last Administration whom President Kennedy asked to stay in their jobs. Both agreed, but Mr. Dulles, now 67, stipulated that he wanted to be relieved within a year.

It is the misfortune of the C. I. A. that none of its triumphs but most of its failures become known to the public at large. It has had to be taken on faith, and the verdict, on the whole, has been good. But this image was shattered by the disastrous failure of the Cuban invasion last April.

No less dismayed by this tragedy than others was President Kennedy. According to an aide who was closely involved with the President during this affair, Mr. Kennedy was "shaken" by the scope of the Cuban miscalculation. Faced with the necessity of making other crucial decisions in foreign affairs, he was "deeply troubled" by his sudden loss of confidence in the whole intelligence apparatus on which these decisions would have to be based.

Among the immediate steps he took was the reactivation of the President's Board of Foreign Intelligence Consultants, with Dr. James C. Killian of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as its chairman. He gave this group an urgent three-fold mandate: to investigate the whole scope of the Government's intelligence activities; to study and recommend means for strengthening it; and to serve on a continuing basis as a watchdog on intelligence performance.


Still Underway

This study is still in progress.
 P 79-00038R00020011012
 that are pertinent to Mr. Mc-

Cone's appointment are known. One is that the C. I. A. has become a chaotic, administrative jungle. The other is that it has become victimized by the feuding and jealousies of other members of the "intelligence community" which it is supposed to coordinate. Among these are intelligence branches of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission. According to reliable reports, each of these has its parochial interests and departmental pride which have made genuine coordination by the C. I. A. all but impossible.

Whether the Killian group was unanimous in proposing Mr. McCone to take over on Mr. Dulles' retirement next month is not known. By some members, however, he is regarded as the ideal choice. This estimate rests, first, on his reputation as a decisive, hard-driving executive; second, on his experience in a number of top level Government jobs over the last twelve years, the latest being that of chairman from 1958 to 1961, of the A. E. C.; and finally on his political knack for getting along with others. Although an active Republican, he was warmly endorsed for the appointment by two Democratic Senators with whom he has had extensive dealings, Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico and Frank M. Jackson of Washington.

What functional changes in C.I.A. may be made as a result of Mr. McCone's appointment cannot be said today. There have been no informed speculation that the operations may be changed administratively from intelligence collection and information. The need here, it is said, is for a higher degree of objectivity and more significant military means in mounting such major undertakings.



"Scrutiny."

600 people on its Washington payroll, and an unknown base elsewhere. Its agents and its operatives have penetrated into every major U.S. military lesser ones, in the